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Abstract
Most of the empirical studies dealing with international business cycles have disregarded the
credibility issues that play an important role in the decision to join or not a monetary union. Most
of empirical applications based on asymmetric shocks have failed to account for these aspects. In
this paper, we tackle this problem by relying on a regime switching approach that characterizes the
position of each economy in its business cycle. Then, using desynchronisation indices based on a non
parametric approach, we measure the amplitude and the duration of divergence in the business cycles
in order to assess the potential stabilization cost induced by the European economic and monetary
union.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of international business cycles is still attracting the interest of the economic profession (see
for instance Canova and Marinan 1998, Ballabriga et al. 1998 or Kwark 1999). A deep understanding of
the sources and propagation of the cycles is crucial to the management of international economic relations.
Previous studies focus on the synchronization of the cycles across countries. However, such an approach
is not very useful from an economic policy point of view. Governments seem reluctant to use economic
policy instruments to respond to every divergence of their cycles. Only large and persistent divergence
may induce some reaction. It is therefore more fruitful to focus on cycles' phases. This approach is
adopted here to analyze European business cycles.
The third and ¯nal stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe started on the
¯rst of January 1999. The Euro became the single and o±cial currency of the eleven participating
countries. At the same time monetary policy setting was transferred to a single authority : the European
Central Bank. As a consequence national policy makers are deprived from a stabilisation instrument,
i.e. monetary policy. They, however, will continue to exert a great deal of in°uence over ¯scal policy
despite the fact that governments are intended to respect the provisions of the stability and growth pact.
Such provisions aim at insuring the stability of the Euro and sound growth conditions for the European
economy.
National autonomy over ¯scal policy is targeted toward responses to national speci¯c shocks. The
stability and growth pact implies budgetary discipline but also acknowledges the need for governments
to react to asymmetric shocks. In particular, the pact pointed out to severe recessions as problematic
periods during which budgetary °exibility could be allowed. Country speci¯c recessions are clearly
situations where greater budgetary °exibility is needed.1
This paper sheds some light on the need for individual European countries to use alternative sta-
bilisation instruments including budgetary policy to respond to future speci¯c recessions. To this end,
we examine the experience of European countries with speci¯c recessions over the past three decades.
Hence, we focus on the comparison of the phases of countries' cycles. We seek to determine to which
extent European countries experienced divergent phases (recessions/expansions) of their cycles in the
past. Our analysis is therefore di®erent from the previous literature concerned with optimum currency
areas (OCA) or international business cycles, which seeks to identify the degree of asymmetry of shocks.
In order to identify the (de)synchronisation of the cycles, this literature uses more or less sophisticated
correlation technics, but however fails to investigate whether countries experience in general similar or
di®erent phases of the cycle. From the stability and growth pact perspective, the relevant concepts are
recessions and expansions, i.e. the phases of the cycles.
Focusing on recessions and expansions instead of raw cycles correlations is also relevant with respect
to the traditional assessment of the actual cost of losing the nominal intra-European exchange rates as
a stabilisation instrument. The European experience suggests that governments are not willing to use
1For an extended analysis of ¯scal policies in relation with the stability and growth pact, see Buti and Sapir (1998).
Fiscal policies as stabilisation tools at the European level could be also implemented through a ¯scal federalism system of
transfers like the one prevailing in numerous federal states (United States, Germany and Canada among others) (see on
this point for instance Sachs and Sala-I-Martin 1991). In this case too, country speci¯c recessions are primarily situations
that are considered.
2
unilateral discretionary policies to react to all divergences of their cycles. Reputation and cooperation
considerations may explain such a behavior. Besides, this is one of the main criticisms emphasized by
De Grauwe (1996) of the traditional OCA theory. For instance, during the eighties, some European
countries did not use the exchange rate instrument to respond to some divergences of their cycles with
respect to the German one. They might have preferred to enhance their reputation as a credible ERM
participant even at the expense of some internal economic di±culties. As a result, allowing for exchange
rate adjustments has been used only in extreme situations, for instance where the involved country faced
a speci¯c (and lasting) recession.
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Figures 1 : French and German Business Cycle and exchange rate alignment
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Figure 2 : Dutch and German Business Cycles and exchange rate realignment
To illustrate the point, let us consider the case of France and the Netherlands. We combine information
concerning the evolution of industrial production since 1979 and the dates of realignments with respect
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to the Deutsche mark (DM). Figures 1 and 2 present a seven months centered moving average of the
rates of growth of industrial production. The growth rates are computed as percentage change of a given
month production with respect to the corresponding month of the previous year. Each ¯gure compares
the German situation (denoted grm) with that of a given country. Industrial production series are drawn
from OECD tapes. The dates of realignment with respect to the DM (noted rea) are indicated by bold
vertical lines. In France the last realignment occurred in 1986. It followed a period of divergent business
cycle between France and Germany. Between 1989 and 1992 the French industrial production growth rate
(frm) slowed down signi¯cantly in comparison with the German one. Despite this divergent evolution
of business cycles and its persistence, realignments of the French franc have not taken place. For the
Netherlands which had engaged in a pegging strategy of the Guilder to the Mark since the early eighties,
credibility can be considered as a still more important aspect given its small size and high openness. The
Dutch industrial production growth rate (nlm) was much more volatile than the German one between
1986 and 1988. It was also by far lower in many instances. This evolution could have been considered as
temporary and had not led to a realignment. More interesting is the fact that the same phenomenon as
in France (although less pronounced) occurred between 1990 and 1992 in the Netherlands. The Dutch
industrial production experienced a persistent slow down in its growth rate in comparison with the
German one but the Netherlands maintained the exchange rate pegging strategy. The analysis of France
and the Netherlands experiences with exchange rate management during the eighties clearly shows that
they seek to maintain the evolution of their DM exchange rate within the band of °uctuations despite
some divergence between their business cycle and the German one. Such a behavior is more noticeable
when we consider the 1987-1992 period during which the credibility of the ERM has become an important
and well established objective.
Numerous studies have focused either on the cycle datation procedure (Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn
1995, Hassler et al. 1994, Candelon and H¶enin 1996) or on the business synchronization issue among
countries (Rubin and Thygessen 1997, Artis and Zhang 1997 and 1999). However, none of them has
simultaneously treated these two questions. In the measurement of synchronization, they are thus unable
to account for the position of economies in business cycle. Furthermore, such analysis often appear too
restrictive, since they rely on only one variable (usually GDP or industrial production) whereas the cycle,
as traditionally de¯ned by Burns and Mitchell (1946), should summarize the information contained in an
exhaustive set of variables. The business cycle characterization can be thus misleading if both a nominal
and a real variable are not included2.
To ful¯ll these lacks, we proceed in two steps. In a ¯rst stage, we estimate the business cycle for each
country with a multivariate Markov Switching model (Hamilton 1994 and Warne 1996) including a real
variable (unemployment) and a nominal one (in°ation). The estimation of this speci¯c Markov Switching
model provides conditional probabilities of being in one particular state which can be interpreted as a
phase of the business cycle (recession or expansion). Another obvious advantage of such an approach is
that the characterisation of the business cycle does not require any expert judgment, like for instance in
the NBER datation procedures. Then, in a second stage, from this business cycle characterization, we
2One exception is Ballabriga et al. (1999) who studied output and in°ation. The two variables are however treated
separately, which may in°uence the identi¯cation of the cycles.
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develop several non parametric indicators of synchronisation, capturing the extent as well as the duration
of the synchronization period.
With the analysis of business cycle phases' synchronisation, the datation of the cycles for various
European countries is thus another contribution of this paper. Indeed, by contrast to the US situation
there is no o±cial datation of European cycles. Although di®erent, the purpose of this paper is related to
previous research on OCA and international business cycles. In the European context, these researches
developed in close connection with the debate concerning EMU. An early study by Cohen and Wyplosz
(1989) found that symmetric shocks were much larger and dominated asymmetric shocks in Europe. Bay-
oumi and Eichengreen (1993) showed that demand shocks are more uniform and less pronounced across
the Member States than supply shocks. Karras (1994) also addressed the question of the propagation
of demand and supply shocks between France, Germany and the UK. He showed that the supply shocks
have been synchronous in the three Member States, and that their business cycles have been highly and
positively correlated. Using sectorial data, Helg et al. (1995) found that the highest degree of business
cycle synchronisation characterizes Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Similar results, although
with some speci¯cities, are obtained by Christodoulakis et al. (1995) and Backus et al (1993). Finally,
Ballabriga et al. (1999) used a structural Bayesian autoregression approach to study the responses to
common and speci¯c shocks in in Germany, France, the UK and Spain. They found that in the short run
symmetrical shocks have dominated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes the methodology, i.e. the Markov Switching VAR
approach along with the building of (de)synchronisation indicators. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The methodology
In order to characterize the business cycle of each economy, we conduct a bivariate Markov Switching
VAR analysis (section 2.1). Then, from the probabilities of being in a particular regime implied by the
VAR, we build desynchronisation indexes aiming at assessing to which extent the European countries
face synchronized cycles (section 2.2).
2.1 Markov Switching VAR Analysis
Let xt be a bivariate time series with components xt = (4ut; 4pt); where 4ut and 4pt are the quarter-
to-quarter changes in respectively the unemployment rate and the consumer price level. Since ut and pt
-which seem to be integrated of order 1 over the whole period under investigation3- are not cointegrated,
the vector xt is assumed to be well characterized by the following general Markov Switching VAR(p)
model :
xt = ¹st +
pP
k=1
Akstxt¡k + ²t; t = 1; 2; :::; T (1)
3See section 3.1 for more details on the stationarity properties of in°ation and unemployment over the investigated
period. The results of the test are reported in Appendix 1.
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where p denotes the VAR order; ²t j st » N(0;-st) with -st the covariance matrix being positive
de¯nite. The special insight given by the Markov Switching (MS) approach is the use of an unobserved
or regime variable st which is assumed to follow a q-state Markov process with transition probabilities
Pr(st = j j st¡1 = i) = pij ; for all t and i; j = 1; 2; :::; q; with
Pq
j=1 pij = 1: The markov process is
assumed to be irreducible (no absorbing states) and ergodic.
Throughout the whole analysis, we will assume that q = 2, i.e. that two regimes are su±cient
to characterize the joint dynamics of changes in unemployment and in°ation.4 Typically, these may
be referred to an expansionary and a recessionary regime. Given the short sample, we will constraint
p  4: In this general speci¯cation, the random vector ¹st , the random matrices Akst and the covariance
matrix -st are allowed to depend on the regime variable st: Nevertheless, in order to use a parsimonious
framework, we also allow for a restricted model in which -st is the same across the two regimes, i.e. that
the volatility of the joint process is the same during booms and busts. In the constrained case, we will
refer to model m = 2 while in the general case, we will refer to model m = 1.
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of model (1) are obtained via the well known Expectation Max-
imum Likelihood-algorithm (see for more details Hamilton, 1994). The underlying distribution in the
ML estimation procedure is assumed to be Gaussian. Our model selection procedure with respect to
m and p will be based on the two following sets of statistics. The ¯rst one is the well known set of
information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion) that are used to select the VAR order p. The
second one will refer to misspeci¯cation tests that allow to assess the goodness-of-¯t properties of the
various estimated models. Three speci¯cation tests -all based on the conditional scores- are applied both
to each equation and to the full system. The ¯rst one is an autocorrelation test that examines whether
the conditional scores with respect to ¹i at time t are correlated with the conditional scores with respect
to ¹j at time t ¡ 1: The second one is an ARCH-type test that compares the conditional scores at time
t with respect to the unique element of -i with the conditional scores at time t ¡ 1 with respect to the
unique element of -j . Finally, we rely on a test investigating the Markov chain assumption along the
lines de¯ned by Hamilton (1991). This test compares the conditional scores at time t with respect to pii
with the conditional scores at time t ¡ 1 with respect to pii and ¹i:5 All selected models are required to
both satisfy one of the information criteria and to pass the misspeci¯cation tests.
Once model (1) estimated, it is possible to recover for all t the implied probability that the economy
k is in state 1 (Pk(st = 1)) that turn out to be the recessionary regime in our analysis. Our subsequent
assessment of desynchronization of business cycles is then based on the sequence of these probabilities.
Thus, by contrast to NBER methods, our cycle datation is fully data driven. Next section exposes the
building of desynchronisation indexes.
4Basically, this choice relies on two arguments. From a purely statistical point of view, there does not exist (to the best of
our knowledge) any statistical test aiming at assessing the presence of a third regime. As a second best, we have estimated
the models with q = 3 and notice in most cases only moderate increases in the log-likelihood values (the results are available
upon request). From an economic point of view, the interpretation of the third regime turns out to be cumbersome and
an asymmetric characterisation (for instance two expansionary regimes and only one recessionary state). In the context
of our analysis, one may argue that the di®erence between two expansionary regimes is irrelevant and does not matter for
assessing the magnitude of the stabilization cost.
²
5See for more details Hamilton (1991).
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2.2 Indicators of Desynchronisation
Indicators of desynchronization help us to assess how coincident are the phases of the business cycle
among a set of countries. If two countries share at the same time an expansion or a recession, they can
be considered as highly synchronized and so, for instance, constitute an optimal currency area without
the need to search for any speci¯c additional stabilisation tool. Therefore, in our MSVAR framework,
a straightforward way to gauge the synchronization degree between two countries simply consists in
comparing the probabilities of being in a particular regime (recession or expansion). If the di®erence is
low, then countries are synchronized, otherwise they are desynchronized. For each pair of countries k and
l, the indicator can be written as follows over the sample f1:::Tg:
I1 = 1 ¡
PT
t=1[Pk(st = 1=It¡1) ¡ Pl(st = 1=It¡1)]
T
(2)
In (2), we consider 1 minus the di®erence in order to get a positive relationship between the indicator
and the synchronization degree. However, this indicator may appear somewhat restrictive. As exposed
in section 2, what matters for assessing the loss of exchange rate as a policy instrument is rather the
relative position of each country in the business cycle. Two countries can share the same phase of the
business cycle, without necessarily displaying similar conditional probabilities. In this last case, credibility
considerations would obviously imply a stability of their bilateral exchange rate.6 In this view, we propose
another indicator that computes the part of the sample during which two countries share the same phase
of the cycle. This indicator is based on a binomic variable Ib, which takes the 1 value if the both countries
share the same phase of the business cycle (both in expansion, in recession or neither in recession nor
in expansion) and the 0 value if they do not share the same phase of the business cycle. To build
this indicator it is necessary to characterize business cycle expansion and recession from our bivariate
probabilistic model. Following Hamilton (1989), a recession (resp. an expansion) is characterized by
a conditional probability of being in state 1 over 0.7 (resp. under 0.3) : Pk(st = 1=It) > 0:7 (resp.
Pk(st = 1=It) < 0:3).
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Then, the indicator can be expressed as:
I2 =
TX
t=1
Ib
T
(3)
However, this indicator may still appear too restrictive. As exposed in section 2, experiences of several
countries suggest that the use of its exchange rate may be called for only when a country faces a relatively
isolated recession (or expansion). Therefore, a third indicator is built. The indicative variable I3 becomes
trinomic and takes a value of 0.5, when countries do not share an opposite phase : if Pk(st = 1=It) > 0:7
and 0:3 < Pl(st = 1=It) < 0:7 or if Pk(st = 1=It) < 0:3 and 0:3 < Pl(st = 1=It) < 0:7.
6Another reason is that a lower value of I1 may simply re°ect a slight di®erence in the estimation of the respective
models.
7The sensitivity of the results to the choice of these limit values has been performed and does not appear to modify
signi¯cantly the results.
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To complete the analysis, we also need a measure of the duration of the synchronization between a
set of countries. Indeed, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) single out the persistence of divergence as equally
important as the extent of divergence when comparing business cycles. Similarly, the need to conduct
stabilisation policies for instance through net ¯scal transfers in a ¯scal federalism system similar to the
one prevailing in the United States or through discretionary domestic ¯scal policies is rather limited if
asymmetric shocks are of a very temporary type (say one quarter). To this aim, an additional indicator
(I4) representing the average length of a synchronization period is also built from the I2 indicator. 8 A
further advantage of the I4 is that its value has a direct economic interpretation. The higher the indicator,
the stronger is the synchronization between the business cycles of the two countries. A low value of I4
associated with a higher value of the other indicators means that countries often share the same phase
of the business cycle, but with frequent and short desynchronization periods. By contrast, a high value
of I4 associated to a low level of the other indicators means that desynchronization and synchronization
periods are quite long and not erratic.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Data issues
In our analysis, we consider two variables, the (changes in) unemployment rate and consumer prices
measured on a quarterly basis. The use of a quarterly frequency is justi¯ed by the need to observe cycles
that are expected to be cushioned by a stabilizing ¯scal policy or by an adjustment of the (e®ective)
nominal exchange rate in the spirit of this study. In turn, the use of unemployment rather than GDP
as a proxy for economic activity is justi¯ed by the non availability of reliable quarterly data over a
su±ciently long period for an important set of countries. Furthermore, by contrast to quarterly GDP,
unemployment data are harmonized across countries, which is crucial for comparison purposes.
All data come from the OECD-BSDB database. We consider 11 European countries including EMU
participants (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Portugal and the Netherlands) but also possible
future candidates (Norway, the UK, Switzerland and Sweden). Because of the poor quality of their
unemployment data, Belgium and Austria were dropped out of our sample.9 The investigated period
ranges from 1975Q1 to 1996Q4. This choice is made for three main reasons. The ¯rst one is related
to the statistical properties of the data. Our MS VAR framework indeed requires the data to be I(0).
For some sub-periods including the early 70's, prices have been be found to follow an I(2) process. In
order to cope with this problem, along the lines proposed by Juselius (1994), we ignore this sub-period.
The second reason lies in the need to consider a period homogeneous with respect to the international
monetary agreements. In this respect, it is advised to consider a post-Bretton-Woods period in which
the pegging of several exchange rates is exclusively due to European arrangements. Finally, for some
countries like Portugal, the unemployment data display a very poor quality before 1975.
8This type of indicators have been extensively used in order to measure exchange rate misalignment (see Per¶ee and
Steinherr (1989)).
9A detailed inspection of the data reveals that most quarterly values have been interpolated from annual data. This is of
course highly problematic in a business cycle analysis conducted on a quarterly basis. Data problems were also encountered
for Denmark, Ireland and Greece.
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As mentioned above, a preliminary important point for our MS-VAR analysis in ¯rst di®erence con-
cerns the stationarity of in°ation and of the changes in unemployment over the investigated period.
To this aim, Appendix 1 presents the results of the two most popular unit root tests, the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (with three di®erent lag order determination procedures) and the non paramet-
ric Phillips-Perron one. This latter may indeed display more power that the ADF tests in small samples
and in the presence of breaks. From Appendix 1, it comes out that in general, there is evidence in favour
of a stationary in°ation process over the 1975Q1-1996Q4 period. For 7 out of 11 countries, in°ation is
clearly found to follow an I(0) process. For two countries (France and Norway), there is some moderate
evidence in favour of a non stationary process but these results are not found quite robust.10 Finally,
for Italy and Spain, in°ation is found to follow a I(1) process, which is to some extent meaningful since
these countries have undergone a continuous desin°ation process over the investigated period. Neverthe-
less, it is well known (see for instance Dolado et al. 1993) that these unit root tests display poor power
properties in ¯nite samples. Given the number of data points (T = 88), the conclusions should be drawn
with caution.11 Second, the stationarity of in°ation is a usual starting point in the empirical analysis
conducted over similar periods (see Juselius 1995 or Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1997 on this point). We
will thus use the (raw) in°ation data in our VAR analysis.
3.2 Estimation results
For each country, the MS VAR models selected along the lines exposed in section 2.1. are presented
in Appendix 2.12 Nearly all models are found to pass the misspeci¯cation tests at a 5% nominal level.
The transition probabilities matrices suggest a quite stable behaviour of our conditional probabilities
P (st = 1=It), which ensures a meaningful decomposition in terms of cycle phases. In Figures (3a) and
(3b) (Appendix 3), the estimated smoothed probabilities are plotted for each country.
From the evolution of the recession probabilities, it is possible to distinguish the major business cycles
phases in each economy. Although not fully comparable13, our results reproduce most of the major
features emphasized by some of the previous studies. For the sake of illustration, Appendix 4 reminds
of the most important turning points for the four major economies identi¯ed by Artis, Kontolemis and
Osborn (1995). In the case of Germany, our implied cycle phases are consistent with the peaks in
79M12 and 86M5 as well as the troughs in 82M10 and 86M12. Moreover, the model captures the
reuni¯cation shock which has been a®ecting the German economy in 91Q1 and its consequences in terms
of in°ationary pressures and unemployment variations. For France, the following turning points are more
or less reproduced : for the troughs, 77M10, 82M10, 85M2 and for the peaks 76M12, 79M9, 82M3, 84M2,
92M1 (with some lag). With respect to the UK, the probabilities are in lines with the detected troughs
(81M2, 84M8, 92M4) and with the peaks (79M4). In the Italian case, the identi¯ed peaks in 77M1,
80M3, 89M12 and troughs in 77M12 and 83M3 are also well captured. The reproduction of these stylized
facts justi¯es the choice of a MS VAR representation to characterize economic °uctuations from which
10The test statistics of the ADF(BIC) and the Phillips-Perron tests are indeed rather close to their critical values.
Furthermore, restricting the period leads to a change in the conclusions.
11Once more, for Italy, the acceptation levels are not very high.
12As stated before, Akaike or Schwarz Bayesian criteria are used to determine the lag structure.
13By contrast to a simple characterisation of turning points, our probabilities provide the global shape of the cycle phases.
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asymmetric shocks are inferred.
Appendix 5 provides the results in terms of desynchronization indicators. Rather than resorting on
a set of bivariate analysis with a chosen reference country (usually chosen as Germany), it is better to
determine an OCA or to assess the stabilisation costs of a geographic zone in a multivariate way, as
pointed out by De Grauwe (1996). This strategy has been followed by several authors like Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1997), Rubin and Thygesen (1997) or Beine, Candelon and Hecq (1998). One obvious
reason is that an OCA is a multi-country concept and its determination is made through multivariate
bargaining. For instance, France may be willing to support Spain's adhesion because of strongly syn-
chronized business cycles even though the correlation between Italy and Germany is relatively low (this
is purely a hypothesis). Therefore, our results are provided in terms of a complete set of cross-country
correlations computed for the three desynchronization indicators.
For each indicator, the use of a threshold value may be useful in order to assess the need of stabilization
policies. Of course, the choice of a speci¯c value is somewhat arbitrary but some robustness analysis may
be easily carried out. Since the indicators are relatively di®erent from each others, it is natural to use
di®erent thresholds. As a matter of choice, we use the following values : 0.6 for I1 and I3, and 0.5
for I2 that turns out to be more restrictive. By contrast, since the I4 indicator has a straightforward
interpretation, i.e. the average number of periods where business cycles are synchronized, the choice of a
speci¯c threshold is much easier. In this respect, an average period of synchronisation of one year, i.e. 4
periods, seems rather reasonable.
From the ¯rst indicator I1; one can distinguish three di®erent groups with respect to their correlations
with the remaining countries under investigation. The ¯rst one includes countries which are found to be
highly correlated either with each others or with other EMU members.14 These are Germany and Italy
(with respectively 6 and 7 values above the threshold) as well as Finland15 and Portugal. Besides, an
intermediate group emerges, including France16, the UK and the Netherlands, which are found to display
similar cycles with the ¯rst group and especially Germany. In this respect, the absence of the Netherlands
may be due to the recent diverging performances of this country in terms of unemployment in comparison
with its European neighbors. It is indeed well-known that over the recent period, the situation of the
labour market in the Netherlands has signi¯cantly improved while the other European members faced
worsening conditions. This recent divergence is re°ected in Figure (3a) by the low conditional probability
of being in the recessionary regime around 1995. Finally, the analysis of the values of I1 suggests the
existence of a third group including countries with rather idiosyncratic cycles.17 This latter would include
Spain, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden. As a whole, these results can be considered more or less in line
with the ¯ndings of the empirical OCA literature.18
As explained above, the introduction of credibility issues through the characterization of cycles phases
is expected to give a more optimistic picture of the actual EMU. To a certain extent, this is con¯rmed by
14This group is often referred to as the "core" in the OCA literature.
15The inclusion of Finland may sound counter-intuitive but this result is also found by Rubin and Thygessen (1997).
16The exclusion of France of the core is also well documented by some other OCA studies like Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1997).
17Similarly, this group is often referred to as the "periphery".
18For recent surveys, see for instance Buti and Sapir (1998). As suggested by a quick overview, it is obvious that most
of empirical OCA studies concludes in favor of a core-periphery distinction. Nevertheless, it comes out that there is a deep
disagreement accross the main studies on the precise composition of the respective groups.
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the inspection of the I2 indicator. It may be seen that for instance the Netherlands but also Spain are
found to have more synchronized cycles with their European partners. In turn, this leads to an extension
of the so-called core group. By contrast, the UK is found to be much less synchronized than implied
by the ¯rst indicator. This suggests that for this country, the peaks and troughs of the business cycles
occur at relatively di®erent times compared to the European continental countries, which is in line with
previous ¯ndings (Artis and Zhang 1997 for instance). The periphery implied by this indicator would
contain the UK, Sweden and to a lesser extent Switzerland and Norway.19
The use of the indicator I3 leads to quite a similar picture, with nevertheless a more pessimistic
assessment for Spain. Nevertheless, while inferior to our chosen threshold, the values of I3 are higher
than those relative to the countries that display low correlations, i.e. the UK, Switzerland, Sweden and
Norway. The computation of this indicator thus con¯rms the main conclusions of the I2 indicator, with
the Netherlands displaying a synchronised cycle and the UK a more speci¯c one. Thus, the I2 indicator
suggests that our ¯ndings are robust to the speci¯c choice of threshold values. In general, it is found
that accounting for the turning points of the business cycles (I2 and I3 indicators) can lead to di®erent
results with respect to more classical indicators represented here by I1:
The I4 indicator turns out to shed an interesting light on the synchronisatiuon patterns of the Eu-
ropean countries. It may be seen that countries like France, the Netherlands or Spain that appeared
to be less synchronised on the basis of the previous indicators display in fact rather long periods of
synchronisation. Incidently, it is found that in average, these countries share the same cycle phase with
Germany at least for a period longer than ¯ve quarters. To a certain extent, the same applies for Switzer-
land. By contrast, countries like Norway, Sweden or the UK face rather short periods of synchronisation.
Combined with the evidence provided by the previous indicators, this means that these countries display
idiosyncratic dynamics and could face rather high stabilisation costs if all stabilisation instruments were
given up.
Henceforth, an homogeneous picture emerges from this non parametric analysis : a core of countries
with synchronized business cycles including Germany, Italy, Finland, Portugal and to a lesser extent the
Netherlands; an intermediate group facing higher potential stabilization costs composed of France and
Spain that could ¯nd useful to rely on domestic ¯scal policies and ¯nally, a peripherical group of economies
facing more idiosyncratic dynamics with the UK, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. Interestingly enough,
the two ¯rst groups are made of countries belonging to the ¯rst stage EMU and the last one includes
non members. This could suggest that the current EMU could work reasonably well without resorting
too often to the provisions of the Stability Pact. Nevertheless, a prospective enlargment of the monetary
union should be accompagnied by additional measures aiming at stabilize national economies.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a comparison of business cycles for most European countries. Relying on
a Markov Switching VAR approach that characterizes the business cycles phases, we implicitly account
for credibility considerations in assessing the asymmetric degree of shocks. In this perspective, we propose
19For these two countries, note that 2 out of the 3 positive occurrences are just above the threshold value (0.5).
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a set of non parametric indicators based on the conditional probabilities of being in a particular regime
implied by the MS VAR. The results suggest that this strategy leads to a more optimistic picture for the
new EMU than those proposed by the other empirical analysis that neglect the position of the economy
in their business cycle. In particular, this suggests that the present EMU countries will not face too
many problems by losing their intra-European nominal exchange rates and that few economies will have
to rely on the provisions of the stability pact. By contrast, some so far excluded countries like the UK
or Norway could face important stabilization costs if joining the EMU without ¯scal autonomy.
This new approach based on the switching regimes VAR models deserves further developments.
Among these, the setting up of a new desynchronization indicator (based on a rank analysis for in-
stance) re°ecting the lags of the turning points between countries could be useful (although the practical
implementation may be cumbersome). A purely inferential procedure testing for the null hypothesis of
(de)synchronisation would also be a valuable development of this approach.
Appendix 1 : Unit Root Tests
4.1 In°ation
ADF(BIC) ADF(AIC) ADF(LM) PP(4)
Por ¡6:48¤¤¤ ¡0:90 ¡0:63 ¡7:23¤¤¤
Swe ¡10:70¤¤¤ ¡10:70¤¤¤ ¡10:70¤¤¤ ¡10:36¤¤¤
Fin ¡8:59¤¤¤ ¡8:59¤¤¤ ¡2:89¤¤ ¡6:13¤¤¤
Nl ¡5:34¤¤¤ ¡2:74¤ ¡5:34¤¤¤ ¡5:53¤¤¤
Ita ¡2:01 ¡0:69 ¡2:01 ¡1:71
Spa ¡1:23 ¡1:23 ¡1:10 ¡1:66
Sui ¡8:47¤¤¤ ¡2:15 ¡9:27¤¤¤ ¡8:71¤¤¤
Uk ¡4:04¤¤¤ ¡4:04¤¤¤ ¡3:71¤¤¤ ¡4:39¤¤¤
Ger ¡3:47¤¤ ¡2:25 ¡6:61¤¤¤ ¡7:00¤¤¤
Nw ¡2:03 ¡1:44 ¡2:03 ¡2:52
Fra ¡2:75¤ ¡2:75¤ ¡1:12 ¡2:46
4.2 Unemployment20
ADF(BIC) ADF(AIC) ADF(LM) PP(4)
Por ¡1:791 ¡1:791 ¡1:791 ¡0:196
Swe 1:394 1:394 1:394 ¡3:280
Fin 0:882 0:882 0:882 ¡2:626
Nl ¡1:687 ¡1:687 ¡1:687 2:416
Ita ¡0:768 ¡0:768 ¡0:768 0:627
Spa 1:080 1:080 1:080 ¡0:985
Sui 1:993 1:993 1:993 ¡2:809
Uk ¡0:059 ¡0:059 ¡0:059 ¡2:487
Ger 0:981 0:981 0:981 ¡1:222
Nw ¡4:092¤¤ ¡4:092¤¤ ¡4:092¤¤ ¡7:794¤¤¤
Fra 2:494 2:494 2:494 ¡1:722
20We use here the logistic transformation, i.e. ln(xt=(1 ¡ xt)); of the unemployement rate since unit root tests require
unbounded variables.
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Adf(BIC) refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics (including a constant term) with lag
order selected through the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Adf(AIC) refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics (including a constant term) with lag
order selected through the Akaike Information Criterion.
Adf(LM) refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics (including a constant term) with lag
order selected through the autocorrelation Lagrange Multiplier test.
PP(4) refers to the non parametric test statistics of Phillips-Perron with a Newey-West window equal
to 4.
¤¤¤ indicates rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1% signi¯cance level.
¤¤ indicates rejection of the null of a unit root at the 5% signi¯cance level.
¤ indicates rejection of the null of a unit root at the 10% signi¯cance level.
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Appendix 2 : Selected Models
Switzerland : Selected Model : m=2, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 36:50 0:85¤¤ 11:29
¢p 59:20 32:70 28:85
system 13:15 20:60 25:72
Transition Matrix :

0:9291 0:0913
0:0709 0:9087
¸
Germany : Selected Model : m=1, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 26:57 16:27 2:58¤¤
¢p 0:26¤¤ 42:83 0:56¤¤
system 16:53 25:53 0:65¤¤
Transition Matrix :

0:9254 0:2400
0:0746 0:7600
¸
The United Kingdom : Selected Model : m=2, p=4
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 64:98 20:65 64:20
¢p 31:62 42:91 53:07
system 18:11 4:21¤¤ 64:24
Transition Matrix :

0:7343 0:2882
0:2658 0:7118
¸
Portugal : Selected Model : m=1, p=2
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 24:21 74:08 26:68
¢p 60:59 7:04¤ 17:20
system 25:93 8:80¤ 37:29
Transition Matrix :

0:7573 0:3278
0:2427 0:6722
¸
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Spain : Selected Model : m=1, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 13:47 44:50 50:70
¢p 6:90¤ 6:50¤ 15:11
system 19:01 67:88 19:86
Transition Matrix :

0:8382 0:1366
0:1618 0:8644
¸
France : Selected Model : m=1, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 10:60 83:11 72:25
¢p 84:48 54:31 47:82
system 34:16 13:93 70:40
Transition Matrix :

0:8927 0:1014
0:1073 0:8986
¸
Sweden : Selected Model : m=1, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 7:83¤ 43:94 13:02
¢p 4:12¤ 21:23 97:53
system 9:42¤ 26:07 21:66
Transition Matrix :

0:5943 0:0655
0:4057 0:9345
¸
Norway : Selected Model : m=1, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 57:52 29:92 40:14
¢p 0:50¤¤ 0:27¤¤ 19:29
system 2:30¤¤ 16:07 24:11
Transition Matrix :

0:8088 0:2146
0:1912 0:7854
¸
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Finland : Selected Model : m=1, p=4
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 14:99 31:14 8:00¤
¢p 10:02 72:08 9:56¤
system 36:83 59:15 8:92¤
Transition Matrix :

0:9008 0:3677
0:0992 0:6323
¸
Italy : Selected Model : m=1, p=4
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 3:93¤¤ 13:16 53:40
¢p 35:20 71:16 64:45
system 23:03 43:55 70:10
Transition Matrix :

0:8661 0:2967
0:1339 0:7033
¸
The Netherlands : Selected Model : m=2, p=1
Equation Autocorrelation ARCH Markov Stability
¢U 0:28¤¤ 0:74¤¤ 8:03¤
¢p 8:34¤ 11:86 63:17
system 5:66¤ 7:60¤ 70:00
Transition Matrix :

0:9302 0:191
0:070 0:809
¸
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Appendix 3 : Smoothed probabilities
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Appendix 4 : Business Cycles Turning Points Datation
Germany France The UK Italy
Peak 80M2 76M12 79M4 77M1
Trough 82M10 77M10 81M2 77M12
Peak 86M5 79M9 83M12 80M3
Trough 86M12 81M1 84M8 83M3
Peak 91M4 82M3 90M3 89M12
Trough 82M10 92M4
Peak 84M2
Trough 85M2
Peak 92M1
Datations are extracted from ¯gures 1 to 7 in Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1995)
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Appendix 5 : Synchronization indicators
France Germany Italy Spain Finland Norway
France        - 0.68071 0.61222 0.59019 0.54158 0.48597
Germany 0.68071         - 0.76163 0.56182 0.70643 0.49720
Italy 0.61222 0.76163         - 0.57104 0.73125 0.53212
Spain 0.59019 0.56182 0.57104         - 0.66783 0.53750
Finland 0.54158 0.70643 0.73125 0.66783         - 0.57343
Norway 0.48597 0.49720 0.53212 0.53750 0.57343         - 
Portugal 0.70430 0.72319 0.69765 0.58873 0.66793 0.55575
The Netherlands 0.45452 0.61406 0.61681 0.55527 0.69480 0.58848
The United Kingdom 0.53369 0.67181 0.60728 0.54513 0.63023 0.42670
Switzerland 0.53154 0.52092 0.56806 0.54250 0.57325 0.59391
Sweden 0.48677 0.41425 0.36870 0.55125 0.37599 0.44962
Portugal The NL The U K Switzerland Sweden
France 0.70430 0.45452 0.53369 0.53154 0.48677
Germany 0.72319 0.61406 0.67181 0.52092 0.41425
Italy 0.69765 0.61681 0.60728 0.56806 0.36870
Spain 0.58873 0.55527 0.54513 0.54250 0.55125
Finland 0.66793 0.69480 0.63023 0.57325 0.37599
Norway 0.55575 0.58848 0.42670 0.59391 0.44962
Portugal         - 0.56660 0.59960 0.48231 0.39581
The Netherlands 0.56660         - 0.53801 0.59003 0.33305
The United Kingdom 0.59960 0.53801         - 0.50362 0.56465
Switzerland 0.48231 0.59003 0.50362         - 0.55700
Sweden 0.39581 0.33305 0.56465 0.55700         - 
Figure 1: Desynchronization Indicator I1
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France Germany Italy Spain Finland Norway
France         - 0.59420 0.50725 0.47826 0.39130 0.39130
Germany 0.59420         - 0.65217 0.53623 0.63768 0.40580
Italy 0.50725 0.65217         - 0.49275 0.68116 0.42029
Spain 0.47826 0.53623 0.49275         - 0.60870 0.50725
Finland 0.39130 0.63768 0.68116 0.60870         - 0.49275
Norway 0.39130 0.40580 0.42029 0.50725 0.49275         - 
Portugal 0.59420 0.66667 0.65217 0.52174 0.62319 0.47826
The Netherlands 0.36232 0.57971 0.56522 0.53623 0.65217 0.56522
The United Kingdom 0.37681 0.55072 0.40580 0.37681 0.44928 0.24638
Switzerland 0.37681 0.42029 0.43478 0.49275 0.50725 0.50725
Sweden 0.40580 0.37681 0.26087 0.52174 0.31884 0.37681
Portugal The NL The U K Switzerland Sweden
Germany 0.66667 0.57971 0.55072 0.42029 0.37681
Italy 0.65217 0.56522 0.40580 0.43478 0.26087
Spain 0.52174 0.53623 0.37681 0.49275 0.52174
Finland 0.62319 0.65217 0.44928 0.50725 0.31884
Norway 0.47826 0.56522 0.24638 0.50725 0.37681
Portugal         - 0.53623 0.44928 0.39130 0.33333
The Netherlands 0.53623         - 0.40580 0.52174 0.30435
The United Kingdom 0.44928 0.40580         - 0.34783 0.46377
Switzerland 0.39130 0.52174 0.34783         - 0.52174
Sweden 0.33333 0.30435 0.46377 0.52174         - 
Figure 2: Desynchronization Indicator I2
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 France Germany Italy Spain Finland Norway
France         - 0.66667 0.60870 0.55797 0.49275 0.48551
Germany 0.66667         - 0.73913 0.55797 0.69565 0.45652
Italy 0.60870 0.73913         - 0.57246 0.75362 0.51449
Spain 0.55797 0.55797 0.57246         - 0.65942 0.53623
Finland 0.49275 0.69565 0.75362 0.65942         - 0.55797
Norway 0.48551 0.45652 0.51449 0.53623 0.55797         - 
Portugal 0.68841 0.71739 0.71739 0.56522 0.67391 0.53623
The Netherlands 0.43478 0.60870 0.63768 0.55797 0.69565 0.60145
The United Kingdom 0.50725 0.68116 0.57971 0.51449 0.59420 0.38406
Switzerland 0.48551 0.48551 0.54348 0.55072 0.57246 0.57971
Sweden 0.48551 0.41304 0.34058 0.55072 0.36957 0.42029
Portugal The NL The U K Switzerland Sweden
France 0.68841 0.43478 0.50725 0.48551 0.48551
Germany 0.71739 0.60870 0.68116 0.48551 0.41304
Italy 0.71739 0.63768 0.57971 0.54348 0.34058
Spain 0.56522 0.55797 0.51449 0.55072 0.55072
Finland 0.67391 0.69565 0.59420 0.57246 0.36957
Norway 0.53623 0.60145 0.38406 0.57971 0.42029
Portugal         - 0.57246 0.58696 0.46377 0.37681
The Netherlands 0.57246         - 0.52174 0.57246 0.31159
The United Kingdom 0.58696 0.52174         - 0.50000 0.57246
Switzerland 0.46377 0.57246 0.50000         - 0.57971
Sweden 0.37681 0.31159 0.57246 0.57971         - 
Figure 3: Desynchronization Indicator I3
21
 France Germany Italy Spain Finland Norway
France         - 5.85714 3.88889 4.12500 4.50000 3.37500
Germany 5.85714         - 6.42857 5.28571 7.33333 3.50000
Italy 3.88889 6.42857         - 4.85714 5.87500 3.62500
Spain 4.12500 5.28571 4.85714         - 4.20000 3.50000
Finland 4.50000 7.33333 5.87500 4.20000         - 3.40000
Norway 3.37500 3.50000 3.62500 3.50000 3.40000         - 
Portugal 5.87514 5.75000 5.62500 5.14286 5.37500 3.30000
The Netherlands 5.00000 6.66667 6.50000 4.11111 7.50000 3.90000
The United Kingdom 2.36364 3.80000 3.11111 3.71429 3.10000 1.70000
Switzerland 4.33333 3.62500 4.28571 4.25000 5.83333 3.50000
Sweden 3.11111 3.25000 2.25000 3.27273 2.75000 2.60000
Portugal The NL The U K Switzerland Sweden
France 5.85714 5.00000 2.36364 4.33333 3.11111
Germany 5.75000 6.66667 3.80000 3.62500 3.25000
Italy 5.62500 6.50000 3.11111 4.28571 2.25000
Spain 5.14286 4.11111 3.71429 4.25000 3.27273
Finland 5.37500 7.50000 3.10000 5.83333 2.75000
Norway 3.30000 3.90000 1.70000 3.50000 2.60000
Portugal         - 9.25000 3.44444 3.85714 3.28571
The Netherlands 9.25000         - 3.11111 6.00000 3.50000
The United Kingdom 3.44444 3.11111         - 2.40000 2.90909
Switzerland 3.85714 6.00000 2.40000         - 4.50000
Sweden 3.28527 3.50000 2.90909 4.50000         - 
Figure 4: Desynchronization Indicator I4
22
References
[1] Artis, M. and W. Zhang (1997), "International Business Cycles and the ERM : Is There a European
Business Cycle ?", International Journal of Finance and Economic vol 2, pp.1-16.
[2] Artis, M. and W. Zhang (1999), "Further Evidence on the International Business Cycles and the ERM
: Is There a European Business Cycle ?", Oxford Economic Papers vol 51, pp.120-132.
[3] Artis, M., Z. Kontolemis and D. Osborn (1995), "Classical Business Cycles for G7 and European
Countries", CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1137.
[4] Backus, D.K.. and P.J. Kehoe (1993), International Evidence of the Historical Properties of Business
Cycles, American Economic Review, 82, 4, pp. 864-88.
[5] Banerjee, A., J. Dolado, J. Galbraith and D. Hendry (1993), Co-Integration, Error Correction, and the
Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[6] Bayoumi, T. (1994), "A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas", IMF Sta® Papers, vol 41.
[7] Bayoumi, T. and B. Eichengreen (1993), "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Uni¯cation", in
F. Torres and G. Giavazzi (eds), "Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union", pp.
193-221.
[8] Bayoumi, T. and B. Eichengreen (1997), "Ever closer to Heaven : An OCA Index for European Coun-
tries", European Economic Review, vol. 41, pp. 761-770.
[9] Beine, M. , B. Candelon and A. Hecq (1997), "Assessing a Perfect European Optimum Currency Area:
a 'Common Cycles Approach" Mimeo, Ministry of the Walloon Region.
[10] Beine, M. and F. Docquier (1998), "A Stochastic Simulation Model of an Optimum Currency Area",
Open Economies Review, vol. 9, no 3, pp. 227-255.
[11] Blanchard, O. and D. Quah (1989), "The Dynamic E®ects of Demand and Supply Disturbances",
American Economic Review, no. 79, pp. 655-673.
[12] Burns, A.F. and A.C. Mitchell (1946), "Measuring Business Cycles", NBER Press.
[13] Buti. and A. Sapir (1998), Economic Policy in EMU, Clarendon Press, Oxford
[14] Candelon, B. and P.Y. Henin (1995), "La r¶ecession des ann¶ees quatre-vingt dix a-t-elle ¶et¶e exception-
nelle ? ", Economie et Pr¶evision no120, 1995-4 pp. 51-71.
[15] Christodoulakis, .N., S. Dimelis and T. Kollintzas (1995), Comparisons of Business Cycles in the EC :
Idiosyncracies and Similarities, Economica, vol. 62, pp. 1-17
[16] Clarida, R., J. Gali and M. Gertler (1997), "Monetary Policy Rule in Practice : Some International
Evidence, CEPR Discussion paper no.1750:
23
[17] Cohen, M. and C. Wyplosz (1989), The European Monetary Union : an Agnostic Evaluation, CEPR
Discussion Paper n± 306:
[18] De Grauwe, P. (1996), "The Prospects of a Mini Currency Union in 1999", CEPR Discussion Paper
no. 1458, September.
[19] Ghironi, F. and F. Giavazzi. (1999), Currency Areas, International Monetary Regimes, and the
Employment-In°ation Tradeo®, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 45, pp. 259-296.
[20] Hassler J., P. Lundvik, T. Person and P. Soderlind (1994), "The Swedish Business Cycle : Stylized
Facts over 130 years" in " Measuring and Interpreting Business Cycles", Clarendon Press, Oxford,
pp. 1-10. Swoboda, eds, "Monetary Problems in the International Economy", Chicago, University
of Chicago Press.
[21] Hamilton, P. (1989), "A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time Series and
the Business Cycle", Econometrica, Vol.2, No. 2, pp. 357-384.
[22] Hamilton, P. (1994), "Times Series Analysis" Princeton University Press.
[23] Helg, R., P. Manassa, T. Monacelli and R. Rovelli (1995), How Much (a)symmetry in Europe ? Evi-
dence from Industrial Sectors, European Economic Review, vol. 39, pp. 1017-1041.
[24] Juselius, K. (1994), On the Duality Between Long Run relations and Common Trends in the I(1)
versus the I(2) Model, Econometric Review, 13, 151-179.
[25] Karras, P. (1994), Aggregate Demand and Supply Shocks in Europe: 1860-1987, Journal of European
Economic History, 22(1), pp. 79-98.
[26] Kenen, P. (1969), "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas : an Eclectic View", in R. Mundell
and A. Swobada (Eds), Monetary problems in the International Economy, Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
[27] Mc Kinnon, R. (1963), "Optimum Currency Areas", American Economic Review, September, pp.
657-665.
[28] Mundell, R. (1961), "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas",American Economic Review, vol. 51,
pp. 715-725.
[29] Peree, E. and A. Steinherr (1989), "Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Foreign Trade", European Eco-
nomic Review, 33, pp. 1241-1264.
[30] Ricci, L.A. (1997), "A Simple Model of an Optimum Currency Area", Economie et Pr¶evisions, no.
128, pp. 1-20.
[31] Rubin, J. and N. Thygesen (1996), "Monetary Union and the Outsiders : a Cointegration-
Codependence Analysis of Business Cycles in Europe", in Economie Appliqu¶ee, tome XLIX, no.
3, pp. 123-171.
24
[32] Sachs, J. and X. Sala-I-Martin (1992), "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas : Evidence
for Europe from the United States", CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 632, March.
[33] Tavlas G. (1993), "The new Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", The World Economy, vol. 16, pp.
663-685.
[34] Warne A.(1996), "Causality in a Markov Switching VAR", Manuscript, Institute for International
Economic Studies, Stockholm University.
25
